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Stephen J. Cole
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Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting
monetary policies. The results show that the beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central bank
pursues price-level targeting instead of inflation targeting. Output and inflation respond more favorably to
forward guidance with price-level targeting than inflation targeting. A monetary policy rule that aggressively
reacts to inflation and includes interest rate inertia narrows the performance gap between the two policy
regimes. However, forward guidance with price-level targeting is still preferred to forward guidance with
inflation targeting after performing multiple robustness checks.
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1. Introduction
The 2007–2009 global financial crisis caused severe adverse effects on economies around the world. Central
banks reacted by implementing unconventional monetary policies as their usual policy of lowering overnight
interest rates had become exhausted due to the zero lower bound (ZLB). A new tool enacted was forward
guidance where the future course of monetary policy is communicated to the public by the central bank. For
example, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced guidance on the future path of the short-term interest rate.
Another instance regards information about its long-term inflation target. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve
communicated in 2012 that “The Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 percent ...is most consistent
over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate” (Federal Reserve, 2012). In this case, forward
guidance is in terms of the path of the Federal Reserve’s long-run inflation target. However, even with these
additional stimulative measures, U.S. inflation had missed its Federal Reserve target of 2% from the period May
2012 to January 2017.1 Thus, is there another way to increase the effectiveness of forward guidance?
The debate about whether a central bank should switch from targeting the inflation rate to the price level has
been accentuated because of the adverse effects of the Great Recession.2 Standard central bank practice and
macroeconomic models recommend a monetary policy that targets the inflation rate. Targeting the rate of
inflation instead of the price level can achieve lower amounts of fluctuations in output and inflation than pricelevel targeting (see Lebow et al., 1992 and Haldane and Salmon, 1995). However, the period from May 2012
through January 2017 witnessed historic low levels of U.S. inflation as it missed its Federal Reserve target

throughout this duration. In contrast, targeting the price-level theorizes stimulative effects to the inflation rate.
This monetary policy regime predicts a period of above average inflation after a deflationary episode as the
central bank must rapidly raise the price level back to its target path.3 Thus, a natural question that arises is if
price-level targeting can increase the positive effects of forward guidance on the economy.
This paper investigates the effectiveness of forward guidance across two monetary policy regimes: inflation and
price-level targeting. A standard New Keynesian model is extended to include a monetary policy rule that takes
two forms. The first policy responds to deviations of the inflation rate from its target. The alternative is a
monetary authority that changes the interest rate due to deviations of the price level from its target. The
targeted price level grows at a rate defined by the central bank’s inflation target. Forward guidance is included
in the model via the central bank communicating about the future course of its inflation target. Anticipated
shocks are added to the inflation target. These shocks represent future deviations in the inflation target known
to agents and communicated by the monetary authority today.
The key difference between inflation and price-level targeting monetary policies regards history dependence.
Under the former regime, history dependence is inherently absent. For instance, historical inflationary shocks do
not play a role in inflation targeting policy. If an adverse shock produced a decline in inflation and the price level,
a monetary authority that targets the inflation rate would only be concerned with bringing inflation back to its
target level. Since it lets bygones be bygones, the drop in the price level does not concern an inflation targeting
central bank. In contrast, a price-level targeting regime is inherently history dependent. It reacts to the low price
level caused by the prior adverse shocks by bringing the price level back to its higher target. This action creates a
period of above average inflation.4
The results show that the beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central bank pursues price-level
targeting instead of inflation targeting monetary policy. These outcomes are shown during a period of severe
economic decline. The monetary authority responds to this recession by implementing forward guidance in the
form of a constant level for the future path of its inflation target.5 The values of output and inflation are higher
under forward guidance with price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting. The results
also favor forward guidance under the former than latter monetary policy when utilizing a loss function based
on variances of inflation, output, and the interest rate. The values of this loss function are higher under forward
guidance with inflation targeting than forward guidance with price-level targeting.
The reasons for the favorable effects of forward guidance under price-level targeting than inflation targeting are
twofold. The first regards the inherent history dependence feature of the former monetary policy regime. A
price-level targeting central bank reacts to the drop in inflation and the price level by using policy to rapidly
bring the latter macroeconomic variable back to its target. This action results in periods of above average
inflation. The second reason concerns how the expectations of agents react to forward guidance statements
given by the monetary authority. In response to central bank forward guidance, agents’ expectations of output
and inflation are more favorable under price-level than inflation targeting. Under the former monetary policy,
agents expect higher future inflation as the central bank will target a higher price level than otherwise would
exist. The increases in inflation expectations lead to higher levels of output expectations. These combined
effects result in larger levels of current output and inflation.
The favorable results under forward guidance with price-level targeting hold across different policy scenarios.
The first investigates whether the performance gap between the two policy regimes with forward guidance can
be reduced if there is a more aggressive monetary policy. A central bank that responds more to deviations of the
inflation rate from its target than it did before can narrow this gap between forward guidance with inflation
targeting and forward guidance with price-level targeting. Introducing interest rate inertia also alleviates the
disparity. By including a lagged interest rate in both inflation and price-level targeting monetary policy rules, the

differences are reduced as the first policy regime has a level of history dependence closer to the second policy
regime. However, forward guidance still has more favorable outcomes under price-level than inflation targeting.
The model’s main results are also robust to different degrees of price stickiness and forward guidance horizons.
When lowering the level of price stickiness in the model, the levels of output and inflation are still higher under
forward guidance with price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting. When varying the
length of the forward guidance horizon, output and inflation respond to forward guidance more favorably under
price-level than inflation targeting.
Overall, the results indicate a primary takeaway: a central bank that pursues price-level targeting instead of
inflation targeting can produce more favorable responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance. For
instance, output and inflation are higher under forward guidance with price-level targeting than inflation
targeting. These results are also confirmed under alternative scenarios.

1.1. Previous literature

The current paper contributes to previous research on the effectiveness of central bank forward
guidance. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) explain how central bank communication about the future course of
policy (e.g. the path of interest rates) is pertinent for successful monetary policy. Swanson and
Williams (2014) empirically show that medium- and longer-term interest rates are influenced by forward
guidance communication. De Graeve et al. (2014) find that the effectiveness of forward guidance depends on
the rationale for implementing this policy. For instance, if the central bank communicates that the reason for
lower than normal interest rates in the future is a forecasted downturn in the economy, the effectiveness of
forward guidance will increase. In addition, Carlstrom et al. (2012) and Del Negro et al. (2012) show that
standard macroeconomic models predict extreme responses of the variables to forward
guidance. McKay et al. (2015)explain that these predictions vary depending on the assumption of complete
markets. Cole (2015) and Cole (2016) state that the unusually large responses and the effectiveness of this
unconventional monetary policy tool may be due to the manner in which expectations are modeled.
Furthermore, the current paper augments these studies by examining the effectiveness of forward guidance
when the central bank implements price-level targeting.
Prior studies have shown the positive benefits of a price-level targeting central bank. Woodford (2003) describes
that a history dependent central bank can improve the power of monetary policy when agents are forward
looking. Svensson (1999) shows that this monetary policy regime acting under discretion can reduce fluctuations
in the inflation rate relative to an inflation targeting central bank. Ball et al. (2005) describe that price-level
targeting is the optimal policy prescription regardless of the type of shock that affects the economy. Under a
central bank acting with discretion, Vestin (2006) also finds that price-level targeting is preferable to an inflation
targeting regime because the former monetary policy regime results in a better tradeoff between inflation and
output gap variability. Giannoni (2014) explains that price-level targeting outperforms inflation when judging by
welfare. Evans (2012); Billi (2008); Wolman (2005), and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)argue that a price-level
targeting monetary policy can alleviate adverse effects of an economy at the ZLB. If there is an adverse shock
that drops the price level, Gaspar et al. (2007) describe that agents will forecast a policy that raises the price
level in the future. This expected increase raises inflation expectations and lowers real interest rates.
Consequently, the decrease in the real interest rate stimulates the economy. Similarly, Cover and
Pecorino (2005) show that a negative inflation shock causes an increase in expected inflation under price-level
targeting, which lowers the real interest rate and increases output. Billi (2015b) shows that price-level targeting
is more effective than nominal GDP level targeting when the future state of the economy is
uncertain. Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2010) explore the type of price index to pursue for a price-level targeting
central bank. In addition, Dowd (2007) describes that the Bank of England’s inflation targeting policy resembles a
price-level targeting strategy as it is dependent on previous period’s inflation.6

Price-level targeting has been studied when relaxing the rational expectations
hypothesis. Williams (2010) investigates this monetary policy under adaptive learning and at the
ZLB. Honkapohja and Mitra (2015b) examine the performance of inflation, price level, and nominal GDP
targeting policies under a New Keynesian model with adaptive learning.7 They introduce forward guidance on
the targeted price level or nominal GDP. The addition of forward guidance to either price level or nominal GDP
targeting can help the economy avoid a liquidity trap.
The contribution of the current paper to the literature is that it examines how the effectiveness of central bank
forward guidance depends on the monetary policy regime.8The preceeding paragraphs explain that a majority of
the prior literature has explored forward guidance and price-level targeting separately. However, some previous
studies have combined forward guidance and price-level targeting. Levin et al. (2010) model forward guidance at
the ZLB under optimal policy. One of their paper’s extensions compares a price-level targeting regime to the
optimal commitment scenario. Honkapohja and Mitra (2015a) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2015b) examine
inflation, price-level, and nominal gross domestic product (NGDP) targeting regimes. Forward guidance is
included in price-level targeting or NGDP, but not in an inflation targeting central bank. Thus, to the best of my
knowledge, none of the prior literature has explicitly examined how the effects of forward guidance vary across
inflation and price-level targeting monetary policy rules. In addition, the main results of the current paper
demonstrate that the effectiveness of forward guidance increases when a central bank pursues price-level
targeting instead of inflation targeting. The main mechanism behind this result is the expectations channel. The
literature has shown that a price-level targeting monetary policy favorably affects expectations of agents
[see Amano et al. (2011) and Cover and Pecorino (2005)]. The current paper demonstrates that the effectiveness
of forward guidance is boosted by a price-level targeting regime relative to an inflation targeting strategy since
forward guidance operates through the expectations channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the New Keynesian model with forward
guidance under both inflation and price-level targeting. Section three shows the results of the model with
forward guidance under both types of monetary policy regimes. Section four investigates the disparity between
the responses of the macroeconomic variables to forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward
guidance with price-level targeting. Specifically, it examines the model’s outcomes under an aggressive
monetary policy and with or without interest rate inertia. Section five contains robustness exercises in which the
degree of price stickiness and the length of the forward guidance horizon vary. Section six compares forward
guidance under inflation and price-level targeting regimes to optimal monetary policy. Section seven concludes.

2. Model

The economy’s aggregate dynamics are described by the benchmark New Keynesian model analyzed
in Woodford (2003) and Preston (2005). The model is derived from microfoundations and contains three
sectors: households, firms, and a monetary authority. The log-linearized equations modeling the first two are
given by
(1)
(2)

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡

𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡

= 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝜎(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 ) + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛
= 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡

Eq. (1) represents aggregate demand in the economy. xt denotes the output gap, which is output in deviation
from the efficient level of output (see Galí, 2008). The output gap is a function of expected one-period ahead
output gap (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 ), the nominal interest rate (it), expected one-period ahead inflation (𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 ), and the natural
real rate interest shock (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 ). σ > 0 measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption across
periods. βis the household’s discount rate and is assumed bound between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0 ≤ β ≤ 1). In addition,
firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment in which they use labor from households to
produce their goods. Following Calvo (1983), a fraction 0 < 1 − 𝛼𝛼 < 1 of producers are able to reoptimize each

period with respect to their price. The remaining α of firms set prices according to the previous period’s price
level. The resulting equation representing the supply side of the economy and the New Keynesian Phillips curve
is given by (2). It relates inflation to expected one-period ahead inflation, output gap, and a cost-push shock (μt).
The parameter 𝜅𝜅 ≡

(1−𝛼𝛼) (1−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
(𝜔𝜔
𝛼𝛼 (1+𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔)

+ 𝜎𝜎 −1 ) > 0 with θ > 1 representing the elasticity of substitution across

differentiated goods. ω is the elasticity of a firm’s real marginal cost with respect to increasing its output. In
addition, the price level is defined by
(3) 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡

= 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡−1

The structural disturbances are assumed to follow AR(1) processes given by
𝑛𝑛

(4) 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡

(5) 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡

𝑛𝑛
= 𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1
+ ɛ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡

𝜇𝜇

= 𝜌𝜌𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−1 + ɛ𝑡𝑡

𝜇𝜇

ɛ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 and ɛ𝑡𝑡 are assumed to be i.i.d. and drawn from a Normal distribution, that
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝜇𝜇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

is, ɛ𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2 ) and ɛ𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁�0, 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 �.

2.1. Monetary authority

The model is closed by describing the central bank. The monetary authority is assumed to follow a policy rule by
either targeting the inflation rate or the price level. The central bank issues forward guidance on the inflation
target.9 This act is akin to the Federal Reserve communicating to the public that its long-run inflation target is
2%. For instance, the Federal Reserve declared in January 2012 that “The Committee judges that inflation at the
rate of 2 percent ...is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate”
(Federal Reserve, 2012). The next two subsections describe central bank monetary policy rules under forward
guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with price-level targeting.

2.1.1. Inflation targeting with forward guidance

When targeting the inflation rate of the economy, the central bank follows a rule similar to Taylor (1993). It is
assumed to adjust the nominal interest rate to changes in itself, output gap, inflation from its target, and an
unanticipated monetary policy shock. Accordingly, the monetary policy rule is given by
(6) 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

= 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)[𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 (𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ ) + 𝜒𝜒𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ] + ɛ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑡𝑡

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

2 ).
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
where ɛ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑡𝑡 is i.i.d. and drawn from a Normal distribution, that is, ɛ𝑡𝑡
Following Del Negro et al. (2014); Milani and Treadwell (2012), and Milani (2009), the inflation target 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ is
assumed to be time varying and is given by

(7)

∗
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜌𝜌𝜋𝜋∗ 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1
+ ɛ𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋

∗

In addition, the monetary authority communicates to the public guidance on the future course of the inflation
target 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗. To model this central bank forward guidance, Eq. (7) is augmented in the following way:

(8)

𝜋𝜋∗

𝐿𝐿

∗
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜌𝜌𝜋𝜋∗ 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1
+ ɛ𝑡𝑡 + � ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙=1

The central bank adjusts its inflation target to changes in the previous period’s target, an unanticipated inflation
∗

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

target shock, and forward guidance shocks.10 I assume that ɛ𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 ∼ 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋2∗ ). Forward guidance is included in the
model via anticipated or forward guidance shocks contained in the last term in Eq. (8). Each forward guidance
shock (ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 ) is i.i.d. and represents communication by the central bank in period 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙 that the inflation target
will change l periods later (i.e. in period t).11 If the monetary authority has been communicating forward
guidance for 1,2, ⋯ , 𝐿𝐿 periods ahead, Eq. (8) would contain Lforward guidance shocks that affect the inflation
target. Therefore, the duration of the forward guidance horizon is defined by L.

Following Del Negro et al. (2012) and Laséen and Svensson (2011), the forward guidance shocks are expressed in
recursive form by adding the following equations:
(9)

𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡

(10)

(11)

𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡
⋮

𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
= 𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−1 + ɛ1,𝑡𝑡

= 𝑣𝑣3,𝑡𝑡−1 + ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
2,𝑡𝑡
=

ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡

′

The vector 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = [𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡 , 𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡 , ⋯ , 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 ] contains all central bank promises known to agents in period 𝑡𝑡 that the
inflation target will change 1,2, ⋯ , 𝐿𝐿 periods later. For instance, v1, t defines all forward guidance information
that agents know in period 𝑡𝑡 such that the inflation target will change one period later. It contains central bank
communication given to agents in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1 that influences the inflation target 2 periods later (𝑣𝑣2,𝑡𝑡−1 ) and
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
current period forward guidance affecting the inflation target one period later (ɛ1,𝑡𝑡
). Since L is the maximum
amount of periods ahead that the central bank issues forward guidance, vL, t only contains current period
forward guidance that affects the inflation target L periods later. In addition, one can use Eqs. (9) - (11) to show
𝐿𝐿
that 𝑣𝑣1,𝑡𝑡−1 = �𝑙𝑙=1 ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−𝑙𝑙 , , which is the last term in Eq. (8). It should also be noted that modeling forward
guidance as in Eqs. (8) - (11) provides a tractable way to model a constant inflation target path. The forward
guidance shocks in Eqs. (9) - (11) can be chosen so that the inflation target is constant across the forward
guidance horizon. This path is similar to the Federal Reserve announcing a long-run inflation target of 2%. This
exercise will be described in Section 3.2.
Forward guidance has previously been modeled in the literature via the same anticipated shocks described in
this section. However, prior research has focused on forward guidance on the interest rate. Specifically, the
anticipated shocks are included in the monetary policy rule and the forward guidance shocks are chosen such
that the interest rate it is constant Lperiods into the future (see Laséen and
Svensson (2011); Del Negro et al. (2012), and Cole (2015) and Cole (2016)). The current paper differs from prior
research in two ways. First, the anticipated or forward guidance shocks are included in the inflation target as
shown in Eq. (8). As will be described in Section 3.2, the forward guidance shocks will also be chosen such that
the inflation target (and not the interest rate) is constant L periods into the future.

2.1.2. Price-level targeting with forward guidance

When targeting the price level in the economy, the central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate to
changes in itself, output gap, price level from its target, and an unanticipated monetary policy shock.
Following Honkapohja and Mitra (2015a); (2015b), and Giannoni (2014), the monetary policy rule under a pricelevel targeting regime is given by
(12) 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡

= 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌)[𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 (𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝜒𝜒𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ] + ɛ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑡𝑡

where ɛ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑡𝑡 is defined as in Eq. (6). Following Woodford (2003, chap. 2), a monetary policy regime
under Eq. (12) is called “Wicksellian.” In addition, the difference between inflation and price-level targeting rules

is that the central bank under the latter policy responds to changes in the price level from a deterministic
trend 𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡 that satisfies

(13)

𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝜋 ∗

Central bank forward guidance is added to the price-level targeting regime by replacing π* in Eq. (13) with the
time-varying inflation target with forward guidance as defined in Eq. (8). The targeted price level becomes
(14)

𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝̅𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗

In other words, the central bank is giving guidance on the future course of the long-run inflation target.12 Since
this is the same forward guidance on the inflation target as in Section 2.1.1, I can compare the effects of forward
guidance under both inflation and price-level targeting regimes. To re-emphasize the point made in the previous
subsection, forward guidance also will be implemented such that the time-varying inflation target will be
constant.
The monetary policy regimes in Eqs. (6) and (12) share both similarities and differences. An important similarity
is that both inflation and price-level targeting monetary policy rules respond to the lagged interest rate, which
implies at least some common degree of history dependence for the two policies. However, the key difference
between inflation and price-level targeting regimes is that the latter includes additional history dependence
than that produced with only interest rate inertia.13 Under a price-level targeting regime, Eq. (12)shows that the
interest rate is adjusted as the price level changes. By Eq. (3), the price level depends on past rates of inflation.
Thus, a central bank that targets the price level inherently considers inflationary shocks that occurred in the past
when setting monetary policy. For example, it will react to previous declines in inflation and price level by using
its policy tool to spring the price level back to its higher target. This policy action creates a period of above
average inflation. This result is an important feature of the price-level targeting regime and will be discussed
further in Section 3.2.
To summarize, the model with forward guidance and inflation targeting is given by aggregate demand, New
Keynesian Phillips Curve, price level, AR(1) processes for the structural disturbances, monetary policy rule with
inflation targeting, time-varying inflation target, and all central bank promises regarding changing the inflation
target, that is, Eqs. (1)-(6) and (8)-(11). When the monetary authority implements forward guidance and targets
the price level, Eq. (6) is replaced by Eqs. (12) and (14).

3. Results
3.1. Parameterization

The values of the model’s structural parameters are displayed in Table 1 and are based on previous
literature. 𝛽𝛽 = 0.99 is a standard value used in prior studies. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption across periods, σ, is set to 0.15. This closely follows Fuhrer (2000). The degree of price stickiness in
the model is assumed to be high at 0.95, which is slightly higher than found in Milani and Treadwell (2012). The
value of κ is set to 0.001. This number corresponds to the values of θ and ω used in Milani and Treadwell (2012).
As a robustness check in Section 5.1, the model’s main results will be examined under a lower degree of price
stickiness, and thus, a different value of κ. There also exists a high degree of persistence in 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 as 𝜌𝜌𝑛𝑛 =
0.95 which agrees closely with Kuester, (Kuester et al., 2007). The value of ρμ is set to equal 0.5, which roughly
follows the rational expectations model of Milani (2009). I also assume that the white noise shocks are not
highly dispersed and there is no covariance between them.

Table 1. Parameter values.
σ
β

Description
IES
Discount Factor

Value
0.15
0.99

Description
Value
κ
Function of Price Stickiness
0.001
α
Price Stickiness
0.95
χπ
Feedback Inflation
1.4
χx
Feedback Output Gap
0.1
χp
Feedback Price
0.25
λ
Loss Function
0.5
ν
Loss Function
0.1
ρn
Autoregressive Demand
0.95
ρμ
Autoregressive Cost-Push
0.5
ρπ*
Autoregressive Inflation Target
0.99
ρ
Interest Rate Inertia
0.75
L
FG Horizon
12
Note: The standard deviations of the structural shocks are set to 0.001. FG means forward guidance.
The values of the monetary policy parameters closely follow prior studies. Under an inflation targeting regime,
the parameter controlling the response of the interest rate to deviations of inflation from its target is set equal
to 1.4. This number roughly follows the rational expectations model found in Milani (2007). Under a central bank
targeting the price level, the parameter χp governs the response of the interest rate to deviations of the price
level from its target. χp is set to 0.25 which is taken from Honkapohja and Mitra (2015a); 2015b),
and Williams (2010). The central bank also adjusts the interest rate positively to the output gap as 𝜒𝜒𝑥𝑥 =
0.1, which follows closely (Cole, 2015). There exists a high degree of inertia in the time-varying inflation target
as 𝜌𝜌𝜋𝜋∗ is set equal to 0.99. This value follows from Milani (2009)and Del Negro et al. (2014). A high level of
interest rate inertia also is present as 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. In addition, the duration of the central bank’s forward guidance
horizon L is chosen to be 12. This value is somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, the model’s results will be examined
in Section 5.2 under shorter and longer forward guidance horizons as a robustness check.

3.2. The effects of forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting

Forward guidance and price-level targeting have received notable consideration since the 2007–2009 financial
crisis. Central bank forward guidance was implemented in response to the global financial
recession. Evans (2012) also argues that price-level targeting can be justified when the economy is dealing with
the effects of an economic recession as the central bank would be missing both components of its dual
mandate, that is, high unemployment and low inflation. For instance, price-level targeting can bring a period of
above-average inflation to help stimulate the economy. With that event in mind, this section examines the
effects of forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting regimes while the economy is experiencing
a recession. This exercise is summarized next and closely follows Cole (2016); 2015),
and Del Negro et al. (2012).14
A nontechnical description of the exercise is given first before detailing the actual procedure. The economy is
assumed to start during a period of “normal” times. A recession then occurs that severely lowers demand, and
consequently, inflation. The central bank responds via its unconventional monetary policy tool of forward
guidance. Specifically, it announces to the public its long-run target of inflation that will be present in the
economy for today and Lperiods into the future.15 The results are then compared across forward guidance with
price-level targeting and forward guidance with inflation targeting.
This exercise is implemented in the following manner. The model is simulated until period 𝑇𝑇 + 1 upon which a
large negative demand shock (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 ) occurs and causes a recession. Negative demand shocks also occur in the
following five time periods.16 The central bank responds by issuing forward guidance such that the long-run
inflation target 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝜋𝜋� ∗ for today and L periods into the future. This corresponds to an unanticipated change in
the current period of 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ and anticipated changes of 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ for L periods into the future. Specifically, the central bank

∗

chooses the unanticipated inflation target shock (ɛ𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 ) and the anticipated forward guidance shocks
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
∗
, ɛ2,𝑡𝑡 , ⋯ , ɛ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
� ∗ for the current period and Lperiods into the future. The macroeconomic
(ɛ1,𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿,𝑡𝑡 ) such that 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋𝜋
results are then compared across inflation and price-level targeting regimes with forward
guidance.17 Furthermore, by following Honkapohja and Mitra (2015b), the value of 𝜋𝜋� ∗ is chosen to be 1.005.

Figs. 1 and 2 and Table 2 show the macroeconomic effects of this forward guidance across the two monetary
policy regimes. The panels in Fig. 1 show the value of the macroeconomic variable without forward guidance
minus the value with forward guidance. For example, a negative value indicates the variable’s value with
forward guidance is higher than without forward guidance. The first and second columns denote the results
under inflation and price-level targeting, respectively. The top, middle, and bottom panels of Fig. 2 display the
difference in the values of the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and
forward guidance with price-level targeting. For instance, a negative number implies the value of the variable is
greater under the latter than former monetary policy. In addition, the top panel of Table 2 under “Benchmark”
shows the values of the loss function which is given by
(15)

ℒ = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ ) + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) + 𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈𝜈(𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 )

The second column indicates the value of (15) under forward guidance and inflation targeting, while the third
column denotes the value under forward guidance and price-level targeting. Eq. (15) follows
from Williams (2010).18 I assume 𝜆𝜆 = 0.5 and 𝜈𝜈 = 0.1 which is taken from Williams (2010).

Fig. 1. Macroeconomic effects of forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting. Note: The graphs show the
difference in the macroeconomic variables between no forward guidance and forward guidance. A positive value indicates
the value without forward guidance is higher than with forward guidance. A negative value indicates the variable’s value
with forward guidance is higher than without forward guidance. The first column represents the model under inflation
targeting. The second column denotes the model under price-level targeting. IT, PLT, and FG mean inflation targeting, pricelevel targeting, and forward guidance, respectively.

Fig. 2. Difference in output gap, inflation, and interest rate between inflation and price-level targeting. Note: The graphs
show the difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward
guidance with price-level targeting. A positive value indicates the value under inflation targeting is higher than under pricelevel targeting. A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level targeting is higher than under inflation
targeting.

Table 2. Loss function values.

Inflation targeting
Benchmark
166.13
Aggressive Inflation Targeting Policy
153.17
(𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 = 2.5)
Aggressive Price-Level Targeting Policy
166.13
(𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 = 1)
No Interest Rate Inertia
178.01
(𝜌𝜌 = 0)
Low Price Stickiness
264.23
(𝛼𝛼 = 0.1)
Short FG Horizon
290.09
(𝐿𝐿 = 6)
Long FG Horizon
127.48
(𝐿𝐿 = 18)
Note: The loss function is found in Eq. (15). FG means forward guidance.

Price-level targeting
117.90
117.90
80.08
119.04
149.91
210.80
106.85

Fig. 1 shows how the effects of forward guidance depend on the monetary policy regime. Under both central
bank policies, forward guidance has a more beneficial impact on the macroeconomic variables than without
forward guidance. The values of the output gap and inflation are larger with forward guidance than without it.
However, the positive impact of forward guidance is greater under price-level than inflation targeting. Thus, the
results show that the beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central bank pursues price-level
targeting instead of inflation targeting monetary policy.19
Similar results are also found when directly comparing the values of the macroeconomic variables with forward
guidance across both inflation and price-level targeting regimes. Fig. 2 displays the differences between forward
guidance under inflation targeting and forward guidance under price-level targeting. The paths of output and
inflation under forward guidance with price-level targeting are higher than under forward guidance with
inflation targeting. This result agrees with Billi (2008) who found that price-level targeting helps to alleviate the

probability that an economy will move into a deflationary or recession period.20The top panel in Table 2 under
“Benchmark” also describes a similar situation. The loss function’s value is lower under forward guidance with
price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting. Under forward guidance with inflation
targeting, the value of the loss function is 166.13 while its counterpart is 117.90.21
What accounts for the more favorable responses under forward guidance with price-level targeting than
forward guidance with inflation targeting? The first reason regards the history dependence feature of the
former monetary policy regime. A price-level targeting central bank takes into account the prior declines in the
inflation rate and price level due to the recession. It will target a higher price level which leads to subsequent
above average inflation. The second reason concerns how agents’ forecasts react to the forward guidance
statements given by the monetary authority. When the central bank announces that it will pursue a long-term
inflation target that is above the current inflation rate, agents will expect a price-level targeting regime to target
higher price levels in the future. This generates higher levels of expected inflation and expected output gap
under price-level targeting than inflation targeting. Fig. 3 displays this reasoning. The lines in Fig. 3 display the
difference in the value of the variable between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance
with price-level targeting. Across the forward guidance horizon, the expectations of the output gap and inflation
are higher under price-level targeting than inflation targeting. The higher levels of expected output gap and
inflation lead to greater current output gap and inflation under forward guidance with price-level targeting than
forward guidance with inflation targeting. In addition, the more favorable responses of expectations under
price-level than inflation targeting confirm the statement of Billi (2008, pg. 3): “... the policymaker can shape
private-sector expectations more effectively under price-level targeting than inflation targeting.” Cover and
Pecorino (2005) also confirm that price-level targeting has a beneficial effect on influencing expectations. The
results in the current paper, however, demonstrate a new contribution. Since a price-level targeting policy is
effective at influencing expectations and forward guidance operates through the expectations channel, the
effectiveness of forward guidance is boosted under a price-level targeting monetary policy regime relative to an
inflation targeting policy.

Fig. 3. Difference in the expectations of output gap and inflation between inflation and price-level targeting. Note: The
graphs show the difference in expectations between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with
price-level targeting. A positive value indicates the value under inflation targeting is higher than under price-level targeting.
A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level targeting is higher than under inflation targeting.

It is also helpful to understand the reaction of the interest rate to forward guidance under both monetary policy
regimes. Fig. 4 shows the actual responses of the interest rate to forward guidance under both price-level
targeting (dashed line) and inflation targeting (solid line). Under both regimes, the forward guidance shocks
deliver lower interest rates as both lines contain only negative values throughout the forward guidance horizon.

A notable feature of Fig. 4 is the lower interest rate under inflation targeting relative to price-level targeting. The
reason is that output and inflation are lower under the former than latter monetary policy regime as displayed
in Fig. 2. Eqs. (6) and (12) indicate that smaller levels of output and inflation imply lower interest rates under
inflation targeting relative to price-level targeting. Moreover, price-level targeting is still more beneficial to the
economy as seen in Figs. 1 and 2. The reason is that forward guidance under price-level targeting more
positively affects agents’ expectations as displayed in Fig. 3.

Fig. 4. Response of interest rate to forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting. Note: The graph shows the
response of the interest rate to forward guidance. The solid line represents the results under inflation targeting. The dashed
line indicates the results under price-level targeting.

Overall, the results show that the beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central bank pursues pricelevel targeting instead of inflation targeting monetary policy. During a recession, the values of output and
inflation are higher under forward guidance with price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation
targeting. Central bank forward guidance is also better able to influence agents’ expectations under price-level
targeting than inflation targeting. Private sector expectations under the former monetary policy regime react
more favorably to forward guidance than under the latter policy. This outcome leads to higher levels of output
and inflation under forward guidance with a central bank that targets the price level than the inflation rate.

4. Investigating the differences
The previous section showed that forward guidance is more effective under a central bank that targets the price
level than the inflation rate. The current portion of this paper seeks to understand this performance gap in
depth by asking the following question: is there a way to narrow this disparity? To attempt to answer this
question, the rest of this section examines two notions–aggressive monetary policy and interest rate inertia–
that can affect the performance of forward guidance under the two monetary policy rules.

4.1. Aggressive monetary policy

The first potential solution to the question of whether or not the disparity between price-level and inflation
targeting with forward guidance can be alleviated regards an aggressive central bank policy. Specifically, what
would the results of Section 3.2 look like if an inflation targeting regime placed a greater emphasis on deviations
of the inflation rate from its target? What if a price-level targeting central bank also responded more
aggressively to deviations of the price level from its target? This scenario is described next and is motivated
by Billi (2008).

The forward guidance exercise from Section 3.2 is repeated under different assumptions about the
responsiveness of the central bank to deviations of inflation from its target and price level from its target.
Specifically, the value of χπ is changed from its original value of 1.4 to 2.5. To allow a central bank under pricelevel targeting to also respond more to the price level, the value of χp increases from 0.25 to 1. The new
“aggressive” numbers are taken from Billi (2008).
Fig. 5 and Table 2 show the results of this exercise. Each line in Fig. 5 shows the difference in the values of the
macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with pricelevel targeting. For example, a negative number indicates the value of the macroeconomic variable is higher
under the latter than the former monetary policy regime. The solid line represents the baseline case
from Section 3.2 (i.e. 𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 = 1.4 and 𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 = 0.25). The dashed line indicates an aggressive inflation targeting
central bank (i.e. 𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 = 2.5). The dotted line means an aggressive price-level targeting regime (i.e. 𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 = 1). The
second and third panels of Table 2 also display the loss function’s value under the two aggressive parameter
schemes.

Fig. 5. Forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting with aggressive monetary policy. Note: The graphs show
the difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance
with price-level targeting with or without aggressive monetary policies. A positive value indicates the value under inflation
targeting is higher than under price-level targeting. A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level
targeting is higher than under inflation targeting. The solid line represents the benchmark case: 𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 = 1.4 and 𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 = 0.25.
The dashed line indicates an aggressive inflation targeting central bank: 𝜒𝜒𝜋𝜋 = 2.5. The dotted line means an aggressive
price-level targeting regime: 𝜒𝜒𝑝𝑝 = 1.

The results show that a more aggressive inflation targeting policy narrows the performance gap, but forward
guidance still performs better with a price-level targeting regime. Fig. 5displays that the aggressive inflation
targeting policy case (i.e. the dashed line) is above the benchmark (i.e. the solid line), but still negative
throughout the forward guidance horizon. Central banks that respond more to deviations of inflation from its
trend close the gap between the two monetary policy regimes as indicated by the dashed line being above the
solid line. However, the negative values of the dashed line still confirm the results of Section 3.2 that forward
guidance performs better under price-level than inflation targeting. The second panel of Table 2 also shows that
forward guidance under price-level targeting is superior to forward guidance under inflation targeting, but the
disparity does decrease. The values of the loss function are 153.17 and 117.90 under forward guidance with
inflation targeting and forward guidance with price-level targeting, respectively. The difference between the two
previously stated values is smaller than the benchmark case of Section 3.2, but still indicates preference for
forward guidance with price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting.

Fig. 5 also displays that the difference in the performance of forward guidance between the two monetary
policy regimes depends on the aggressiveness of a price-level targeting central bank. If χp increases, the superior
performance of forward guidance with price-level targeting relative to forward guidance with inflation targeting
grows. This result is seen in Fig. 5 as the dotted line is below the solid line. The difference in the values of the
loss function in the third panel of Table 2 are also larger than under the benchmark case.

4.2. Interest rate inertia

A distinguishing feature of a price-level targeting monetary policy rule is its inherent history dependence as
explained in Section 2.1.2. This characteristic is a reason why forward guidance produced more favorable
responses of the macroeconomic variables under price-level than inflation targeting. In addition, the model
in Section 2 added an amount of history dependence common to both monetary policy regimes by allowing
interest rate inertia in Eqs. (6) and (12). However, a natural question may arise regarding the inclusion
of 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 and the performance of forward guidance under both central bank regimes. Specifically, does the
performance of forward guidance with inflation targeting relative to forward guidance with price-level targeting
deteriorate when interest rate inertia is not introduced into the model? To put it another way does the disparity
between the two policy regimes under forward guidance decrease by allowing history dependence via 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 ?

This section performs the exercise from Section 3.2 under the baseline case of interest rate inertia and no
interest rate inertia. Specifically, Eqs. (6) and (12) are assumed with 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 and 𝜌𝜌 = 0. The results are
displayed in Fig. 6 and in the fourth panel of Table 2. In Fig. 6, each panel depicts the difference between the
macroeconomic variable’s value under forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with
price-level targeting. The solid line represents the baseline case of 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 and the dashed line indicates 𝜌𝜌 = 0.
The loss function values without interest rate inertia are also displayed in the fourth panel of Table 2.

Fig. 6. Forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting and the effect of interest rate inertia. Note: The graphs
show the difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward
guidance with price-level targeting under different values of ρ. A positive value indicates the value under inflation targeting
is higher than under price-level targeting. A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level targeting is
higher than under inflation targeting. The solid line represents the benchmark case: 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75. The dashed line indicates no
interest rate inertia: 𝜌𝜌 = 0.

Overall, the results show that the introduction of interest rate inertia narrows the performance of forward
guidance between the two monetary policy regimes, but with price-level targeting still preferred. When 𝜌𝜌 = 0,
Fig. 6 reveals that output and inflation are still higher under price-level than inflation targeting. This outcome
supports the main results of Section 3.2. However, these differences decrease overall when interest rate inertia
is included. The second panel of Fig. 6 shows that the line without interest rate inertia (i.e. the dashed line) is
below the baseline case (i.e. solid line) throughout the forward guidance horizon.22 A noticeable feature of the

first panel is that the dashed is above the solid line (only) in the first period. However, the solid line is above the
dashed line throughout the vast majority of the forward guidance horizon indicating that the differences
between forward guidance with price-level targeting and forward guidance with inflation targeting decrease
with the introduction of interest rate inertia. In addition, the fourth panel of Table 2 shows that the difference in
the values of the loss function between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with
price-level targeting is smaller when 𝜌𝜌 = 0.75 than 𝜌𝜌 = 0. While forward guidance with price-level targeting is
still preferred, the previous result indicates that the performance gap shrinks when interest rate inertia is
included.
The reason for the improved performance of forward guidance with inflation targeting regards the increase in
history dependence. When interest rate inertia does not exist, history dependence is found only in the pricelevel targeting rule as it responds to previous inflationary shocks. When 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 exists in both monetary policy
rules, inflation targeting now assumes a degree of history dependence making its characteristics and
performance closer to the price-level targeting rule. In addition, this history dependence is a desirable feature
for monetary policy. Giannoni (2014) explains that an optimal price-level targeting rule achieves more desirable
fluctuations in the macroeconomic variables than under a Taylor rule with inflation targeting.
Overall, the results of the previous two subsections suggest additional affirmation for forward guidance with
price-level targeting. A monetary authority that responds aggressively to deviations of the inflation rate from its
target can improve the performance of forward guidance. However, a central bank that responds to deviations
of the price level from its target is still preferable when implementing forward guidance. In addition, introducing
a lagged interest rate into both models helps to improve the performance of forward guidance. However, this
unconventional monetary policy still achieves better results under price-level targeting than inflation targeting.

5. Robustness
5.1. Influence of price stickiness

The results in Section 3.2 showed that beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central bank pursues
price-level targeting instead of inflation targeting monetary policy. This result was assumed under 𝛼𝛼 =
0.95,, which is a high degree of price stickiness in the economy. A natural question that arises is how does the
effectiveness of forward guidance under price-level targeting change if the price level is more flexible. Since this
monetary policy regime is inherently concerned with the price level, will the results of Section 3.2 change if price
stickiness is lowered? This section investigates this question by examining the robustness of the model’s results
to a lower price stickiness value.
Fig. 7 and the fifth panel of Table 2 display the results under a lower value of the price stickiness parameter. To
capture a lower degree of price stickiness, the dashed line in Fig. 7represents the model’s results under 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1.
The baseline case of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.95 is also included and depicted by the solid line. As is similar to the previously
described exercises, each panel represents the difference between the macroeconomic variable’s value under
forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance with price-level targeting. Furthermore, the fifth
panel in Table 2 shows the values of the loss function under 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1.

Fig. 7. Forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting and the effect of flexible prices. Note: The graphs show
the difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward guidance
with price-level targeting under different values of α. A positive value indicates the value under inflation targeting is higher
than under price-level targeting. A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level targeting is higher than
under inflation targeting. The solid line represents the benchmark case: 𝛼𝛼 = 0.95. The dashed line indicates flexible
prices: 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1.

The results confirm that forward guidance with price-level targeting is preferred to forward guidance with
inflation targeting and that flexible prices can magnify these results. The fifth panel of Table 2 shows that the
value of the loss function under forward guidance with price-level targeting is still lower than under forward
guidance with inflation targeting. Fig. 7displays that forward guidance produces values of output and inflation
that are higher under price-level than inflation targeting across different values of α. The output and inflation
lines contain negative values throughout the entire forward guidance horizon. These results agree with the main
outcomes of Section 3.2. In addition, the reduction in value of α changes the effectiveness of forward guidance
with price-level targeting. By assuming more flexible prices in the economy, the difference between forward
guidance with price-level targeting and forward guidance with inflation targeting is more favorable under 𝛼𝛼 =
0.1 than 𝛼𝛼 = 0.95. The dashed line is below the solid line in the second panel of Fig. 7 indicating a higher level of
inflation under forward guidance with price-level targeting. As price stickiness decreases, the central bank can
influence the price level more, and thus, forward guidance with price-level targeting is more effective than
forward guidance with inflation targeting. A notable feature is that the dashed line is higher than the solid line
for output.23 The reason is as follows. Because the inflation rate is higher under forward guidance with pricelevel targeting under 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1 than 𝛼𝛼 = 0.95,, the interest rate is also higher under this monetary policy as seen
in the bottom panel of Fig. 7. The higher interest rate reduces the effects on output. Therefore, the differences
between output’s value under forward guidance with price-level targeting and forward guidance with inflation
targeting are not as large when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.1 rather than 𝛼𝛼 = 0.95.

5.2. Alternative forward guidance horizons

This section examines the importance of forward guidance effectiveness when the forward guidance horizon is
changed. Specifically, does the superior performance of forward guidance under price-level targeting relative to
inflation targeting depend on the length of the forward guidance horizon? To answer this question, the exercise
from Section 3.2 is repeated under different values of L. To capture a long forward guidance horizon, the results
are examined under 𝐿𝐿 = 18. This alternative is represented by the dotted line in Fig. 8 and the seventh panel
in Table 2.24 To capture a short forward guidance horizon, the results are studied under 𝐿𝐿 = 6 as indicated by

the solid line in Fig. 8 and the sixth panel in Table 2. The benchmark outcomes under 𝐿𝐿 = 12 are also
represented by the dashed line in Fig. 8.

Fig. 8. The effects of forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting and across different horizons. Note: The
graphs show the difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and forward
guidance with price-level targeting across different forward guidance horizons. A positive value indicates the value under
inflation targeting is higher than under price-level targeting. A negative value indicates the variable’s value under price-level
targeting is higher than under inflation targeting. The solid line represents a short forward guidance horizon: 𝐿𝐿 = 6. The
dotted line indicates a long forward guidance horizon: 𝐿𝐿 = 18. The dashed line denotes the benchmark case: 𝐿𝐿 = 12.

Fig. 8 and Table 2 show that forward guidance with price-level targeting is still preferable to forward guidance
with inflation targeting regardless of the length of the central bank’s commitments. The values of output and
inflation are higher under forward guidance with price-level targeting than inflation targeting across the
different forward guidance horizons. This result is evidenced by each line in Fig. 8 being negative indicating that
forward guidance with price-level targeting is more effective than forward guidance with inflation targeting. In
addition, the three lines follow essentially the same path until its respective forward guidance horizon is
complete. Thus, the length of the superior performance of forward guidance with price level targeting relative to
inflation targeting is either increased or decreased depending on if the forward guidance horizon is extended or
reduced. Furthermore, the values of the loss function confirm that forward guidance with price-level targeting is
preferred regardless of the length of the forward guidance horizon. The bottom two panels in Table 2 show that
the loss function is larger under forward guidance with inflation targeting than forward guidance with price-level
targeting across shorter and longer horizons.
Overall, the results of the previous robustness subsections indicate preference for forward guidance with pricelevel targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting. Forward guidance produces higher values of
output and inflation under price-level than inflation targeting across low and high levels of the price stickiness
parameter α. Forward guidance also produces more favorable results under the former monetary policy scheme
regardless of the length of the central bank’s forward guidance horizon.

6. Extension: optimal monetary policy

The results of Section 3.2 studied the effectiveness of forward guidance across two simple monetary policy
rules: inflation and price-level targeting. However, it would be useful to compare the performance of forward
guidance under those two policy regimes to optimal monetary policy. Therefore, this section examines the
results of the optimal monetary policy scenario. Following Galí (2008), the central bank is assumed to minimize:

(16)
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1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐸𝐸0 � 𝛽𝛽 𝑡𝑡 (𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡2 )
2
s.t. 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡

𝑡𝑡=0

= 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡

The exercise from Section 3.2 is performed under optimal monetary policy and compared to the baseline
cases.25 For simplicity, this section assumes no recessionary shocks.26
The results in Fig. 9 show that the effect of forward guidance under both inflation and price-level targeting
policies results in larger changes of output and inflation relative to the optimal monetary policy plan. The dashed
line represents the difference between forward guidance with inflation targeting and optimal monetary policy.
The dotted line denotes the difference between forward guidance with price-level targeting and optimal
monetary policy. The solid line indicates the difference between forward guidance with inflation targeting and
forward guidance with price-level targeting. For instance, the dashed line in the top panel of Fig. 9denotes the
value of the output gap under forward guidance with inflation targeting minus the value of the output gap under
optimal monetary policy. Across the forward guidance horizon, the dashed and dotted contain positive values
indicating that forward guidance under both inflation and price-level targeting policies produce higher amounts
of output and inflation than the optimal plan. The reason is that forward guidance is a component of both pricelevel and inflation target policies, while it is absent from optimal monetary policy. Forward guidance on the
inflation target creates increased positive changes to the expectations of agents, and thus, increases current
output and inflation.

Fig. 9. Forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting vs. optimal monetary policy. Note: The graphs show the
difference in the macroeconomic variables between forward guidance with inflation targeting and optimal monetary policy
(dashed line), forward guidance with price-level targeting and optimal monetary policy (dotted line), and forward guidance
with inflation targeting and forward guidance with price-level targeting (solid line). For instance, the dashed line in the top
panel of Fig. 9 denotes the value of the output gap under forward guidance with inflation targeting minus the value of the
output gap under optimal monetary policy.

The higher levels of output and inflation also imply greater changes in the loss function with forward guidance
under inflation and price-level targeting relative to optimal monetary policy. For this section, the welfarerelevant loss function is computed as in Galí (2008). The values of the welfare-relevant loss function for forward
guidance with inflation targeting, forward guidance with price-level targeting, and optimal monetary policy are
43.77, 104.96, and 13.13, respectively.27 The reason for the discrepancy between forward guidance under the

two baseline policy specifications and optimal monetary policy is that output and inflation change more under
forward guidance with inflation and price-level targeting policies as seen in Fig. 9. The larger movement in these
variables causes higher variation and thus relatively larger values of the welfare-loss function. Moreover, the
scope of this paper focused on how the effectiveness of forward guidance varies across inflation and price-level
targeting regimes. The results in this section still confirm the main results of the paper: forward guidance with
price-level targeting outperforms forward guidance with inflation targeting as seen in Fig. 9.

7. Conclusion
Forward guidance has emerged as a pertinent tool for central bank authorities since the 2007–2009 Great
Recession. However, U.S. inflation has continually missed the Federal Reserve’s target of 2% over the period
May 2012 to January 2017. In addition, since the global financial crisis, price-level targeting has gained notable
attention due to its predictions of above-average inflation in response to deflationary episodes. Thus, it is of
interest to investigate whether forward guidance’s effect on the economy can be increased under a central bank
targeting the price level instead of the inflation rate.
This paper investigates the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance across two policy regimes: inflation
and price-level targeting. The results show that the beneficial effects of forward guidance increase if a central
bank pursues price-level targeting instead of inflation targeting monetary policy. When the central bank
communicates guidance on the future course of its inflation target, output and inflation produce more favorable
responses to forward guidance under price-level targeting than inflation targeting during an economic crisis. The
reasons are twofold. The inherent history dependence feature of the former monetary policy implies a period of
above average inflation. Agents’ expectations of output and inflation also respond more favorably to forward
guidance with price-level targeting than inflation targeting. This previous statement provides a key contribution
of this paper to previous research. Prior literature has shown that price-level targeting can greatly influence the
expectations of agents relative to inflation targeting (see Billi, 2008). Since forward guidance operates through
the expectations channel, the current paper shows that the effectiveness of forward guidance is increased by a
price-level targeting policy relative to an inflation targeting strategy. In addition, the performance gap between
the two monetary policies narrows if a central bank aggressively responds to the inflation rate and includes
interest rate inertia in its monetary policy role. However, output and inflation still respond more favorably to
forward guidance under price-level than inflation targeting. The results are also robust to flexible or rigid prices
and shorter or longer forward guidance horizons. Overall, the type of targeting policy by a central bank is
important when understanding the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance.
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Inflation is defined as the twelve-month growth rate of the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index.
This index can by found on the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The acronym is
PCEPI.
2
For instance, Evans (2012) describes the positive benefits of price-level targeting when Federal Reserve policy
has failed to achieve its dual mandate.
3
Hall et al. (1984) and Hall and Mankiw (1994) also argue that price-level targeting helps with personal planning.
For instance, they explain that a more stable and predictable price level caused by price-level targeting
benefits the purchasing power of private pensions.
4
In the model presented in this paper, I also assume interest rate inertia to both inflation and price-level
targeting regimes. This feature adds a degree of common history dependence to both policies. However,
price-level targeting still has the inherent history dependence as discussed in this paragraph.
5
This is akin to the FOMC stating its long-run objective for inflation of 2%.
6
For additional discussion of the positive benefits of price-level targeting, see Côté (2007) and Ambler (2009).
7
Honkapohja and Mitra (2015a) also perform a similar analysis without nominal GDP targeting.
1

The two monetary policy regimes considered in this paper are inflation targeting and price-level targeting. The
former policy is standard practice among central banks, while the latter has gained recent attention
because of its beneficial predictions on the inflation rate (see Evans, 2012).
9
Forward guidance on a policy variable other than the interest rate variable has been previously modeled in the
literature. For example, Honkapohja and Mitra (2015a) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2015b) incorporate
forward guidance on the target path of the price level under price-level targeting regime. However,
forward guidance is not included in the inflation targeting monetary policy.
10
Milani and Treadwell (2012) model the time-varying inflation target in a similar fashion to (8), but their focus is
on policy news and not forward guidance.
11
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012) utilize the anticipated shocks from a news perspective. Cole (2016); 2015),
and Del Negro et al. (2012) model the anticipated shocks as forward guidance on the interest rate.
12
Eqs. (9)-(11) are also added to the system as forward guidance is defined in the same way as in Section 2.1.1.
13
Bundick (2015) and Hills and Nakata (2014) show the significance of history dependence in monetary policy
when the economy is at the ZLB.
14
Cole (2016); 2015), and Del Negro et al. (2012) conduct a similar exercise with forward guidance on the
interest rate.
15
This forward guidance should not be interpreted as temporarily raising the inflation target in response to
recessionary shocks. Rather, it is clarification and direction about the target rate of inflation in the short
term (i.e. low inflation period) and long term. Indeed, Section 5.2 examines the results when L is
increased to include longer horizons.
16
The six period length of the recession corresponds to the duration of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
17
Billi (2015a) has examined the effects of three different monetary policy regimes–a simple monetary policy
rule, price-level targeting, and nominal GDP targeting–under an adverse demand shock, but without
forward guidance.
18
Williams (2010) examines price-level targeting under the adaptive learning approach. Honkapohja and Mitra
(2015b) and Orphanides and Williams (2006) also use a similar loss function. In addition, in the context
of the exercise of this section, the time-varying inflation target in Eq. (15) will be fixed across the
forward guidance horizon. As explained in the third paragraph of this section, the unanticipated inflation
and forward guidance shocks are chosen such that πt*=π¯* across the entire forward guidance horizon.
19
A notable finding in the forward guidance literature regards the “forward guidance puzzle”
of Del Negro et al. (2012). They find that standard macroeconomic models predict an unusually large
reaction of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance. Subsequent research has proposed reasons
for this finding (e.g. McKay et al., 2015 and Cole, 2015). However, the focus of this paper is to show how
the effects of forward guidance vary depending on the monetary policy regime. Thus, while it would be
an interesting topic to consider for a future study, it would be beyond the purpose of the paper to offer
a solution to the forward guidance puzzle with the model presented in this paper.
20
Billi (2008) examines price-level targeting but does not include forward guidance.
21
These numbers are higher compared to Williams (2010) who investigated price-level targeting without forward
guidance. However, the recession assumed in this current paper can add to the loss function’s total.
22
The results agree with Giannoni (2014) who found that price-level targeting regimes are still preferable to
inflation targeting when a high level of interest rate inertia exists in the model.
23
However, the dashed line is still negative indicating higher values of output under price-level targeting than
inflation targeting.
24
As is similar to 3.2 The effects of forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting, Fig. 8 shows the
difference in forward guidance’s effectiveness between inflation and price-level targeting. Thus, a
negative value indicates that the value of the macroeconomic variable is larger under forward guidance
with price-level targeting than forward guidance with inflation targeting.
25
The value of αx equals 0.048, which is taken from Giannoni (2014).
8

The main results do not change, that is, forward guidance with price-level targeting outperforms forward
guidance with inflation targeting as Fig. 9 shows.
27
The reason that the welfare-relevant loss function’s value is greater under forward guidance with price-level
targeting than inflation targeting is as follows. Since output and inflation are higher under the former
regime and there are no recessionary shocks in this scenario, higher amounts of variation under forward
guidance with price-level targeting imply a larger value of the welfare-relevant loss function relative to
forward guidance with inflation targeting. Moreover, the main results of the paper still hold as forward
guidance with price-level targeting outperforms forward guidance with inflation targeting as seen
in Fig. 9.
26

